Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Chemical incidents involving the release of substances hazardous to human health may carry the risk of serious adverse health and economic effects due to its nature and frequently unpredictable consequences. According nearly 2 000 000 injured [1] . Chemical disasters taking place in Europe over the last few decades have contributed to development and publication of the Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities, popularly known as the Seveso Directive [2] ; Seveso is the name of a town in Italy where the release of about 2 tons of chemicals, including toxic 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), took place on July 10, 1976 [3] . The provisions of the Seveso Directive and its amendments in 1996 (Seveso II) and 2012 (Seveso III) are intended to implement consistent regulations reducing the likelihood and mitigating the consequences of major chemical accidents within the European Union (EU) [4, 5] . Provisions in question mainly relate to obligations connected with risk management in enterprises of increased or high risk of industrial accident (so called lower-tier and upper-tier establishments), the latter including those in which dangerous substances listed in Annex I to the Seveso III Directive are used in specified amounts. Currently in the EU, more than 10 000 plants fall under these provisions [6] . (2011) upper-tier establishments, whereby Poland was listed as 9th among the European countries with highest chemical accident risk [7, 8] . According to data collected by the National Headquarters of the State Fire Service (Komenda Główna Państwowej Straży Pożarnej) and the Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection (Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Środowiska), in Poland there are approximately 4 times more plants posing threat of serious industrial accidents that do not meet the criteria qualifying them as lower-tier or upper-tier establishments (so called non-Seveso establishments) [9, 10] . The legal requirements for safety management in nonSeveso establishments are much less restrictive than in lower-tier and upper-tier establishments, which may result in a greater probability of a chemical incident occurrence.
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Reports of chemical incidents that took place in Poland between 1999 and 2009, generated using the mentioned IT software designed for use by local and national firefighter headquarters were analyzed. A preliminary analysis of 32 030 events connected with the release of chemicals, taking place in Poland in 1999-2009 showed that 9.14% (2930) incidents met the adopted definition of a chemical incident. The definition covered sudden events associated with uncontrolled release or threat of release of chemical substances or mixtures hazardous to human health, which may potentially lead to human exposure (excluding fires and explosions). The verification process also included events related to the release of unidentified substances or mixtures where emergency services had taken action to protect human health or environment. Chemical substances or mixtures which fulfill the classification criteria relating to the hazards arising from physico-chemical properties, toxicological or ecotoxicological profile defined in the Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP) Regulation [12] and substances or mixtures unidentified during rescue operations, were regarded as representing hazardous substances (alternatively called dangerous substances). Incidents connected with the release of petroleum derivatives are not included, mainly due to the significant number of traffic accidents that could give a distorted picture of the true situation. Because of the large number of substances released or threatened to be released in chemical incidents during considered period (> 200 different substances), they were classified into 13 groups of substances and mixtures posing analogous or similar risks. Categorizing of substances was made taking into account the criteria for classification of substances and mixtures described in the CLP Regulation [12] , guidelines on chemical safety assessment for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation [13, 14] , as well as guide titled: "The 2008 emergency response -Guidebook" [15] (Table 1) .
In available literature there are only few analyses of individual cases prepared mainly in the context of technical capabilities of emergency services, but there is no reliable assessment of general population health risk connected with exposure attributable to uncontrolled leakage of hazardous substances. Developing the database in the NIOM, containing selected and verified information about chemical incidents enabled the identification of risks to health and the environment resulting from the release of hazardous substances in an uncontrolled manner. The article presents the analysis of data on chemical incidents in Poland collected in 1999-2009 with particular reference to hazards they offer to human health.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
The scope of activities and the number of rescue operations performed by fire brigades in Poland show that the data collected by the National Centre for Rescue Coordination and Civil Protection is sufficient to illustrate the actual situation in Poland in the sphere of chemical incidents. Moreover, the collected data concerns all incidents, describing not only releases that occurred in industrial sites (including Seveso and non-Seveso plants) or transport but also in municipal settings. Thereby the data provides a solid basis for the analysis of spatial and temporal distribution of chemical incidents in Poland in 1999-2009 in the context of health hazards. The analysis of data in question was carried out in stages by: -obtaining and verifying data from the chemical incident reports prepared by rescuers at the scene, using a multimodal information technology (IT) system designed to support the work of state fire service, -creation of a database containing systematic and clear information about the chemical incidents in the scope enabling the analyzes aimed at health risk assessment, with application of some solutions used in IT system for the HSEES provided by the ATSDR, -qualitative and quantitative analysis of the collected data in the context of human health hazards. 
RESULTS

Spatial and temporal distribution
In 1999-2009, among 2930 incidents, in 89% (2606 incidents) the hazardous substance was actually released, while in 324 cases (11%) there was a threat of release. In that period, the average of 266 incidents were reported annually, with the highest number of incidents in 2004 (308 events), and the lowest in 2009 (223 events) ( Figure 1 ). transport were present. Many incidents included in this group took place also in garbage dumps ( Figure 6 ). Figure 7 ). The frequency of incidents involving the release of specific substances was also analyzed. Propane-butane, anhydrous ammonia, hydrochloric acid, sulfuric(VI) acid and mercury were the most frequently released chemicals. These 5 substances were reported in 34% of all cases (991) in the considered period. Comparing the data on the most occurred most often were public buildings (469 cases, 16%), mainly buildings for educational purposes (schools, kindergartens, etc.) (221 incidents). The smallest percentage of chemical incidents in this period took place in forests and agricultural areas (18, 0.6% and 32, 1.1%, respectively). Places denoted as "other" in Figure 6 , where 25% of the incidents occurred, included mostly sides of the roads and rail trails where the released substance was identified and no particular means of frequently released substances with the result of the research conducted by Gajek et al. [10] these are the same substances as those most frequently used in so called nonSeveso plants (Table 3) . The regression analysis of the number of chemical incidents connected with the release of specific groups of substances over time was performed. The groups of substances and single substances which were released more than 150 times in the considered period 1999-2009 were analyzed:
Type of chemical substances released
The release or threat of release of a hazardous substances in 60% of cases occurred inside, and less than 40% outside of building interiors. The places where the particular groups of substances were released most frequently are presented in the Table 4 . the return of the last rescue unit participating in the action ( Figure 10 ). Rescue operations most commonly performed by fire fighters at the scene included: securing the site of event (in 99.2% of cases); identification of chemicals released (71% of cases), and the collection, removal, cleaning of chemicals released (47.9% of cases). Evacuation of people was performed in 15.5% of the events and the rescue activities directly related with premedical help were carried out in 5.5% of cases ( Figure 11 ). Distribution for the whole period considered and each year is similar.
-group I substances (371 cases) and propanebu tane (249 cases), -group II substances (285 cases) and anhydrous ammonia (234 cases), -group VII substances (207 cases), -group IX substances (635 cases) and hydrochloric acid (199 cases), -group XI substances (258 cases), -group XIII substances (178 cases). No statistically significant dependence was observed (r < 0.5, p > 0.05) in 1999-2009 for the number of chemical incidents in particular groups of substances and single substances apart from group XI. Only for group XI substances, a statistically significant downward trend was observed (p < 0.05) in 1999-2009 ( Figure 9 ).
The course of rescue operations
In the analyzed period (1999-2009), rescue actions were carried out by an average of 12 rescuers, and the most common size of the rescue group was 6 people. Considering the duration time of rescue operations, 67% lasted from 1-5 h from the moment of reporting the event to is due to the fact that the events related to the release of those gases took place in facilities of public utility, schools in particular. The Figure 12 shows the number of chemical incidents requiring evacuation of indoor space occupants, by the group of released substances.
Victims
From 1999 to 2009 in 369 chemical incidents (12.6%) 1997 people were injured, and 18 of the injuries were fatal (Table 5, Figure 13 ). The largest group of victims were children (1092), who (excluding unidentified substances) were the most frequently exposed to irritant and other incapacitating gases, including pepper gas/spray (325 injured). These were most commonly releases connected with hoax or other intentional action, and the exposure occurred most often in schools. Similar
Taking into account the type of the substance released, the evacuation was carried out most often (in 42.5% of cases) in the case of release of irritant and other incapacitating gases, including pepper gas/spray (group IV). This Groups as in Table 1 . out on the basis of a harmonized classification criteria consistent with the CLP Regulation in force since 2008 [12] . In such cases where the unambiguous substance identification was not possible or substance did not have harmonized classification, hazard identification was made on the basis of the UN numbers [17] , the analysis of descriptive characteristics made by rescuers and emergency procedures applied at the scene [15] .
Hazard identification was possible in nearly 90% of the analyzed incidents. In 389 incidents, the type of substance released could not be determined. The absolute number of events connected with the release of unidentified substances and their percentage in the total annual number of incidents are presented in the Figure 14 .
The regression analysis of number of chemical incidents connected with the release of the unidentified substances during the considered period did not demonstrate statistically significant trend (r = 0.106, p = 0.757). The annual percentage of events in which the substance released was not specified in the total number of incidents remained at a similar level (8-18%) in 1999-2009. Because of the large number of substances released in chemical incidents in the analyzed period, categorization of substances into 13 groups of chemicals posing analogous or similar hazard for humans was made to ensure clear and transparent identification of threats (Table 1) .
observations were described by Wattigney et al. [16] who analyzed the data concerning the years 1996-2003 collected in the US under the HSEES project. The second largest group of victims were employees (519 injured), among whom the highest number of deaths was recorded (11, 61% of fatalities).
The largest group of injured employees was exposed to non-flammable corrosive liquids (group IX, 84 victims including 1 fatality) and flammable, corrosive and/ or toxic gases (group II, 76 victims including 3 fatalities).
The third largest group of victims was the general population (214 victims including 6 fatalities), among whom most people were exposed to non-flammable corrosive liquids (group IX, 27 injured), flammable corrosive toxic and/ or harmful liquids and solids (group XI, 25 people), and gases hazardous only due to physico-chemical properties (group I, 20 injured). In the analyzed period, 46 rescuers (including 28 firefighters) were injured in chemical incidents, none fatally (Table 5, Figure 13 ). also skin and eye irritant (14 cases) or highly flammable toluene, which is also skin irritant (11 cases). These substances are also classified as causing adverse health effects as a result of long-term exposure, including the carcinogenic, mutagenic and reproductive toxicity. However, taking into account the specifics of a potential contact resulting from incidental release, the effects caused by long-term exposure were considered less important in the categorization process. In addition, group VII included adhesives, solvents and paints (83 events) for which the classification is usually similar. Other groups of substances were released in < 200 incidents in 1999-2009. From the health risk perspective, significant is the fact that in described incidents nearly 2000 people were injured, including 18 fatalities. As it was mentioned already, the largest group of victims were children (1092), most frequently exposed to irritant gases and other incapacitating gases, including pepper gas/spray. The described situation resulted mainly from several incidents that were connected with hoax or similar intentional releases of chemicals at schools during lesson time when significant percentages of pupils/ students were inside the classroom. Therefore, the need for the systematic analysis of threats and creating the possibility to estimate the health risks associated with chemical incidents seems reasonable. Currently there is no sufficiently detailed information regarding the concentrations of the substances released in chemical incidents and the precise identification of exposed population is not feasible; thus subsequent stages of risk assay, i.e., exposure and dose-response relationship assessment cannot be performed. Usage of the measuring equipment after incident was declared in 948 events (32%), but any (often inaccurate) information on the results of measurements are reported for approximately 490 events (17%). Furthermore, the reports from the scene of event do not include either information on distance from the measuring points to the source of During the categorization of substances, also the potential possibility of exposure after release resulting from the general properties of the substance (i.e., state, volatility) was considered. Most common releases were connected with non-flammable corrosive liquids (group IX), including: hydrochloric acid (199 cases), sulfuric(VI) acid (131 cases), sodium and potassium hydroxides (69 cases), ammonia solution (52 cases) and butyric (32 cases), phosphoric(V) (14 cases) and formic (11 cases) acids. The next group, by the number of incidents that occurred in the analyzed period, consisted of gases hazardous only due to their physico-chemical properties (group I), including: extremely flammable propane-butane (249 cases), methane (79 cases), propene, acetylene, hydrogen (6-19 cases) and oxygen (5 cases) classified as an oxidant that may cause or intensify fire. The third group (group II) included flammable gases, corrosive and/or toxic substances with flammable, toxic if inhaled and corrosive anhydrous ammonia (234 cases) and extremely flammable hydrogen sulfide, which can be fatal if inhaled (24 incidents). Additionally, group II included hydrogen cyanide due to the nature of threats caused, i.e., classification of the liquid and its vapors as extremely flammable and fatal if inhaled. Group XI -flammable corrosive toxic and/or harmful liquids and solids, was the fourth group of substances, taking into account the number of chemical incidents (258 cases). In this group among others were identified: highly flammable methanol, toxic if inhaled, in contact with skin and if swallowed (12 cases); corrosive white phosphorus, inhalation and ingestion of which may result in death (14 cases); tetrahydrothiophene, toxic if inhaled, in contact with skin and if swallowed (19 cases); corrosive hydrogen peroxide, toxic if inhaled and if swallowed (18 cases); xylene, toxic if inhaled and in contact with skin (12 cases) and plant protection products (66 cases). In group VII -among flammable irritant liquids and solids there were identified: highly flammable benzene which is compounds in group XI, was restricted by the national action plan aimed at reducing the risks associated with their use [18] , which may also contribute to reducing the number of incidents involving those chemicals. The number of victims reported in the analyzed period was 1997, including 1092 children and 18 fatalities. The number of people injured, not significantly decreasing the number of incidents, the high 9th place of Poland in terms of the number of Seveso establishments, and 4 times higher the number of hazardous industrial establishments not covered by the Seveso Directive, justify the need for systematic analysis of threats and their proper identification. The current risk analysis would make it easier for the state administration representatives to better plan the effective preventive strategies, including appropriate allocation of capability package, which in turn would help reduce the number of people injured in incidents involving hazardous chemicals. Especially, due to the number of injured children, the verification of existing preventive procedures in this field at schools seems important. It would be recommended for the competent authorities to consider the additional actions aimed at raising awareness of students and school employees in the case of dangerous chemical release. It seems also advisable to ensure that more extensive health risk assessment, both qualitative and quantitative is made possible by modifying the structure of the reports from the scene of the incidents. Reliable characteristics of particular voivodeships of Poland in that respect, allowing to plan the effective preventive strategies and allocate capability package appropriately, could also result in reduction of rescue service costs. the leak, or potentially exposed groups of people, which makes it impossible to determine the actual level of exposure. For this reason, the final quantitative characteristics of the risk is not possible.
DISCUSSION
CONCLUSIONS
The scope of data collected at the scene of incident is sufficient to perform the analysis of spatial and temporal distribution of chemical incidents in Poland in the analyzed years 1999-2009, including among others: the number of people affected and the type of chemicals released. The presented analysis enable hazard identification associated with uncontrolled releases of chemical substances. Unequivocal identification of hazard was possible in 90% of incidents, but the lack of data on levels of exposure, concentration of the substances released and the precise definition of vulnerable population made it impossible to attempt full risk assessment. The number of chemical incidents analyzed in the years 1999-2009 amounted to 2930 (an average of 266 per year). There was no statistically significant trend associated with the total number of incidents in subsequent years. Similarly, no statistically significant changes were observed in the number of incidents connected with the most commonly released substances, including propane-butane, anhydrous ammonia, hydrochloric and sulfuric acid and mercury. Only for group XI (flammable corrosive toxic and/ or harmful liquids and solids), the regression analysis revealed statistically significant downward trend (p < 0.05) in the number of incidents in 1999-2009. It is assumed that this situation may be the result of legal regulations connected with trade of chemicals. Substances included in group XI are very often subject to restrictions or authorization of production and use (e.g., chromium(VI) compounds, propylene oxide) as posing serious threats to health [13] . These regulations force entrepreneurs to reduce their use and seek for less harmful alternatives. Moreover, the use of plant protection products, which accounted for the largest proportion of 
